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CASTAGNO as Administrator of the
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Heirs of THOMAS TONY CASTAGNO,

Case No. 17241

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS MEADOW SPRINGS RANCH
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN CHURCH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
MEADOW SPRINGS RANCH CORPORATION,
INC., ESTATE OF THOMAS TONY
CASTAGNO, ALBERT J. and BERNICE B.
CASTAGNO, MYRON T. CASTAGNO,
EUGENE CASTAGNO, individually, and
EUGENE CASTAGNO as Administrator
of the Estate of THOMAS TONY
CASTAGNO, RICHARD CASTAGNO, JOHN
DOES and JANE DOES, One through
Six, as Heirs of THOMAS TONY
CASTAGNO,

Case No. 17241

Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant filed a complaint seeking, in his first cause
of action, to quiet title to an approved application to
appropriate water and for damages against respondent Meadow
Springs Ranch, Inc., for allegedly preventing appellant from
perfecting his claim to the appropriation.
In a second cause of action, appellant sought damages
from respondents Albert J. Castagno and Bernice B. Castagno
for alleged breach of an oral agreement to assist in perfecting
appellant's claim to the subject appropriation and for alleged
breach of an oral agreement to sell a 3/5 interest in said
appropriation to appellant.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
on April 1 and 2, 1980, the Court rendered judgment in favor
of all respondents as to both causes of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmance of the judgments entered
in their favor by the District Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's first cause of action sought to quiet title
in his favor to a 3/5 interest in an approved application to
appropriate water, No. 32822, on record with the State Engineer
of the State of Utah.

(Ex. P-1)

The application was originally filed by Bernard Castagno
on March 13, 1961, for 5 second-feet of water to be used for
irrigation, stock-watering and domestic purposes.

The applica-

tion was later approved and, by virtue of Change Application
No. A-3927 (Ex. D-14), was deemed a supplemental appropriation
in addition to 5 second-feet approved under Application No.
30900 (Ex. P-4) •

Both appropriations were to be diverted

from the same wells and applied on a 460 acre parcel of land
owned by Bernard Castagno and his wife Gertrude Mae Castagna.
After Bernard Castagno's death, Gertrude Castagno
conveyed the real property, as to which application No. 32822
was appurtenant, to Gledhill, Inc., by a Warranty Deed dated
March 16, 1971, and duly recorded thereafter.

(Ex. P-10).

The deed included a conveyance of all water rights appurtenant
to the land.
-2-
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Gledhill reconveyed the property to Terracor by a
Warranty Deed recorded on March 23, 1971.

(Ex. P-8).

That

deed also transferred all water rights used in connection with
the property.
Thereafter, pursuant to an exchange agreement (Ex. P-7)
Terracor conveyed the subject property to Thomas Tony Castagno by
a Warranty Deed dated and recorded on March 23, 1971.
P-6) .

(Ex.

That deed also conveyed all appurtenant water rights.
After the death of Thomas Tony Castagno the subject

property was distributed to his children under a Decree of
Distribution of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele
County, dated November 27, 1972.

(Ex. P-11).

The children of Thomas Tony Castagno later formed a
family corporation, Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation, Inc., and
conveyed the subject property to the corporation by Warranty
Deed dated July 7, 1973, which included a transfer of all water
rights appurtenant thereto.
Prior to conveying

the land to Meadow Springs Ranch,

the Castagno children mortgaged the property to the Federal
Land Bank of Berkeley, including therein the water rights
appurtenant to the property under the subject applications.
The Bank notified the State Engineer of its claim and the same
was acknowledged by a letter from the State Engineer dated
June 5, 1973.

(See Ex. P-1)

The evidence at trial indicated that two wells were
drilled and the water appropriated under applications 32822
and 30500 was beneficially used on the Meadow Springs Ranch
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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....
In support of that contention, appellant cites the case
of McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948),
correctly noting that the mere filing of an application does not
vest a person with the right to use water unless it is approved
by the State Engineer or district court on an appeal.

Appellant's

analysis, however, ceases at that point and ignores the remainder
of the opinion in McGarry, supra, which is critical to and
dispositive of the instant appeal in favor of respondents.
In the first instance, Section 73-3-18, Utah Code Annotated
(1953), provides specifically for the transfer or assignment of
water rights claimed under an unapproved application to appropriate water so long as the conveyance thereof is in writing and
acknowledged in the manner provided for acknowledging conveyances
of real property.
That statutory provision was obviously designed to
provide for the orderly transfer of water rights where, as in
in the initial conveyance by Gertrude Castagno, the water rights
under an application have not yet matured into a vested right
by way of issuance of a certificate of appropriation.
The Utah Supreme Court in McGarry, supra, concluded that
the statute intended there to be no distinction as to the
transferability of an approved or unapproved water right,
stating:
This provision expressly
authorizes the transfer or
assignment of rights claimed
under an application for the
appropriation of water, prior
to the issuance of a certificate of appropriation.
It
-6-
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makes no distinction between
an approved application and
one which has not yet been
approved. For us to read
into that statute such a
distinction would be to place
a meaning in the statute which
there is no evidence that the
legislature intended.
201 P.2d at 291
The final, and most critical, proposition set forth in
the McGarry case deals with the question of priority of water
rights.

Under Section 73-3-18, and its predecessor statute

considered in McGarry, the priority of a water right, once approved,
is determined as of the date the application is filed, not the
date a certificate of appropriation is issued.

The Utah Supreme

Court stated:
No vested right to the use
of water is acquired by the mere
filing of an application to
appropriate water. And no
such right can be acquired as a
result of such filing unless such
application be approved either by
the State Engineer, or by the
court on an appeal therefrom.
But the filing of such an application is the initiating step in
acquiring such a right without
which no such right can be
acquired and the priority of
any water right later acquired
through such initiating step is
determined from the date of
filing the application a~d ~ot
from the date of appropriation.
This is a valuable inchoate
right which may mature into a
vested right to the use of
water. . . . In the face of
this express statute and in the
absence of any constitutional
prohibition, we conclude ~hat
an application to appropriate
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...
unappropriated waters is
assignable even though it
has not been approved by the
State Engineer.
201 P.2d at
292.
In applying the rationale of the McGarry case to the
present appeal, it is apparent that Gertrude Castagna conveyed
away all of her water rights under application No. 32822,
whether approved or unapproved at the time of the original
transfer being immaterial, and the ultimate right which resided
in the Castagna heirs and Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation was
an appropriated water right with priority as of the original
filing date of application No. 32822 in March of 1961.
The facts are undisputed that the water in question
was appurtenant to the land originally owned by Bernard and
Gertrude Castagna.

The application No. 32822 made reference

to the land, the points of diversion were on the land and the
water was intended to be and, in fact, beneficially applied
for irrigation purposes on the land.
An unbroken chain of authority, as well as Section 73-311, Utah Code Annotated (1953) , firmly establishes the proposition that a conveyance of real property includes water appurtenant to that property unless the granter "expressly" reserves
the right to the use of the water.

As stated in the case of

Cortella v. Salt Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 72 P.2d 630 (1937),
"(t) his has been the statutory rule at least as far back as
1888."

72 P.3d at 635.
That rule derives from the definition of a water right

as an incorporeal hereditament and thus real property.
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Cartel~

v. Salt Lake City, supra; In re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah
2d 208, 271 P.2d 846 (1954).
The only way in which Gertrude Castagno could have
preserved an interest in the water appropriated under application
No. 32822 would be by virtue of an express reservation in the
Warranty Deed conveying the subject property.

The case law has

stringently applied and strictly construed the requirement
that the reservation be "express" Stephens v. Burton, 546
P.2d 240 (1976); concurring opinion of Justice Hall in Roberts
v. Roberts, 584 P.2d 378 (1978).
Not only did Gertrude Castagno, and all subsequent
transferors, not expressly reserve a right but rather, she
expressly conveyed in plain language all water and water rights
appurtenant to or used in connection with the land in question.
Appellant further seeks to support his claim to a 3/5
interest in application No. 32822 by urging a restrictive interpretation of Section 73-3-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953), so
as to require that the only valid method of transferring the
rights under application No. 32822 is by way of an assignment
which, if duly acknowledged and filed with the State Engineer,
gives the assignee a priority over an unrecorded assignment.
Appellant's position ignores the clear import of the
McGarry opinion which construed that statutory provision so as
to promote the free transferability of unapproved rights which
may later mature into vested water rights.

The section was not

intended to otherwise limit the transfer of water rights by
deed or other conveyance.
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Even assuming for the sake of an argument that the
original conveyance by Gertrude Castagno of her water rights
was ineffective to pass title to the approved application,
appellant must still fail in his attempt to assert a valid 3/5
interest by assignment.

Under the McGarry rationale, the

assignee must be a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice of any previous assignment.

In the first instance,

neither the assignment from Gertrude to Albert Castagno was
for value nor the subsequent assignment to appellant, inasmuch
as he had already contracted to sell the land and provide the
water described therein to Albert and Bernice Castagno.

The

assignments were purportedly intended only to complete delivery
of the promised one second-foot of water.
As to the remaining requirement, appellant obviously
had notice of the previous transfer of water rights under
application No. 32822.

All of the pertinent conveyances were

recorded with the Tooele County Recorder, imparting constructive notice of the water transfers.

Further, appellant had

actual notice by virtue of his researching file 32822 at the
State Engineer's Office which contained several references to
the chain of title leading to Meadow Springs Ranch.
In the language of Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 at
141, cited in McGarry, supra, 201 P.2d at 293:
'Whatever is notice enough
to excite attention and put the
party on his guard and call for
inquiry is notice of everything
to which such inquiry might have
led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact,
he shall be deemed conversant of it.'
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In this case, appellant had ample notice so as to put
him on quard and to require him to ascertain the true title
to the water in dispute.
Appellant's position is simply logically absurd.

To

find that the original conveyance was void and that Gertrude
Castagno retained an interest for many years to application No.
32822, despite the fact that the application was perfected and
the water beneficially applied by subsequent transferees, amounts
to a torturing of the facts.
The truth is that Gertrude Castagno conveyed all of her
rights under No. 32822 with no express reservation thereof and
the Castagno heirs and Meadow Springs Ranch received clear title
thereto.

The purported assignment of a 3/5 interest to appellant

was merely a sham transaction.
The findings and judgment quieting title in favor of
Meadow Springs Ranch are amply supported by the evidence and
should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON
APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
The trial court ruled that all issues arising from the
Uniform Real Estate Contract executed between appellant and
Albert and Bernice Castagno were decided in Castagno v. Church,
552 P.2d 1282 (1976) and the same were res judicata as to the
instant case.
The court further found that the separate oral agreement between appellant and Albert and Bernice Castagno conferred
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upon appellant only a contingency interest in the 3/5 portion
of application No. 32822 in issue herein and that appellant's
3/5 interest was conditioned upon his successfully acquiring
title to the full five second-feet appropriated under No. 32822.
The only consideration for the 3/5 interest was to be
the efforts of appellant in seeking to acquire title to the water
and was not related to any claimed abatement of the purchase
price under the land sale contract.
Appellant's claim for damages for the alleged failure
of Albert and Bernice Castagno to provide him with three secondfeet of water is without merit.

The quieting of title in favor

of Meadow Springs Ranch automatically voided any claim to the
subject water for impossibility inasmuch as there was no water
to be assigned to the Castagnos or appellant.
In addition, the entire scheme to assign the rights
to application No. 32822 was concocted and promoted by appellant
and, as the trial court correctly concluded, failed only due to
appellant's inability to perfect his claimed assignment of the
application.
Appellant is not entitled to damages as against Albert
and Bernice Castagno in view of his failure to perfect title nor
against Meadow Springs Ranch Corporation for successfully
asserting its title to the subject appropriation.
The trial court's judgment on appellant's second cause
of action should be affirmed as to all respondents.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, respondents request the Court
to affirm the judgment of the trial court in its entirety.
DATED this

'/:ti. day

of May, 19Bl.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
Attorney for Meadow Springs Ranch

JOHN A. ROKICH
Attorney for all Defendants except
Meadow Springs & Albert J. and
Bernice B. Castagno
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of Respondents'
Brief to Kenneth M. Hisatake, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant,
1825 South Seventh East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105; and to
Douglas F. White, Attorney for Respondents Albert J. and Bernice
Castagna, Prudential Plaza, 185 North Main, Suite B-1, Tooele,
Utah 84074, this

~~day

of May, 1981.
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